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Summer School on
Matching Problems,
Markets and Mechanisms
David Manlove
1
Nobel prize in Economic Sciences, 2012
Outline
2
Tutorial 1
The Hospitals / Residents problem
and its variants
with applications to Junior Doctor
Allocation
3
Primer: computational
complexity (1)
4
Primer: computational
complexity (2)
5
where
opt(I)
is the measure of an optimal solution
Centralised matching
schemes
6
Tutorial Outline
7
1.1: Classical Hospitals / Residents
problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
Tutorial Outline
8
1.1: Classical Hospitals
/ Residents problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
Hospitals / Residents
problem (HR)
9
HR: example instance
10
r1: h2 h1
r2: h1 h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1 h3
r4: h2 h3
h1: r1 r3 r2 r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r6 r1 r4 r5
r6: h1 h2
h3:
r4 r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
HR: example matching
11
r1: h2
h1
r2: h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2 h3
h1:
r1
r3 r2 r5
r6
r5:
h2
h1
h2:
r2
r6 r1 r4
r5
r6:
h1
h2
h3: r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h1)}
(size
5
)
HR: stability
12
1.
r
,
h
find each other acceptable
and
2. either
r
is unmatched in
M
or
r
prefers
h
to his/her assigned hospital in
M
and
3. either
h
is undersubscribed in
M
or
h
prefers
r
to its worst resident assigned in
M
HR: blocking pair (1)
13
r1: h2
h1
r2: h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2 h3
h1:
r1
r3 r2 r5
r6
r5:
h2
h1
h2:
r2
r6 r1 r4
r5
r6:
h1
h2
h3: r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h1)}
(size
5
)
(r2, h1)
is a blocking pair of
M
HR: blocking pair (2)
14
r1: h2
h1
r2: h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2 h3
h1:
r1
r3 r2 r5
r6
r5:
h2
h1
h2:
r2
r6 r1 r4
r5
r6:
h1
h2
h3: r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h1)}
(size
5
)
(r4, h2)
is a blocking pair of
M
HR: blocking pair (3)
15
r1: h2
h1
r2: h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2 h3
h1:
r1
r3 r2 r5
r6
r5:
h2
h1
h2:
r2
r6 r1 r4
r5
r6:
h1
h2
h3: r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h1)}
(size
5
)
(r4, h3)
is a blocking pair of
M
HR: stable matching
16
r1:
h2
h1
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3:
h1
h3
r4: h2
h3
h1: r1
r3 r2
r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2
r6 r1
r4 r5
r6: h1
h2
h3:
r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r6, h2)}
(size
5
)
r5
is unmatched
h3
is undersubscribed
HR: classical results
17
Resident-oriented Gale-Shapley
algorithm
18
M =
;
while
(some resident ri is unmatched and has a non-empty list)
{ ri applies to the first hospital hj on his list;
M = M
{(ri,hj)};
if
(hj is over-subscribed)
{ rk = worst resident assigned to hj;
M = M \ {(rk,hj)};
}
if
(hj is full)
{ rk = worst resident assigned to hj;
for
(each successor rl of rk on hj
’
s list)
{ delete rl from hj
’
s list;
delete hj from rl
’
s list;
}
}
}
RGS algorithm: example
19
r1: h2 h1
r2: h1 h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1 h3
r4: h2 h3
h1: r1 r3 r2 r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r6 r1 r4 r5
r6: h1 h2
h3:
r4 r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
RGS algorithm: example
20
r1: h2 h1
r2: h1 h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1 h3
r4: h2 h3
h1: r1 r3 r2 r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r6 r1 r4 r5
r6: h1 h2
h3:
r4 r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
Stable matching:
M = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r6, h2)}
Tutorial Outline
21
1.1: Classical Hospitals / Residents
problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents
problem with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
Hospitals / Residents
problem with Ties
22
1.
r
,
h
find each other acceptable
2. either
r
is unmatched in
M
or
r
prefers
h
to his/her assigned hospital in
M
3. either
h
is undersubscribed in
M
or
h
prefers
r
to its worst resident assigned in
M
HRT: stable matching
(1)
23
r1: h1 h2
r2: h1 h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1 h3
r4: h2 h3
h1: r1 r2 r3 r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r1 r6(r4 r5)
r6: h1 h2
h3:
r4 r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
HRT: stable matching
(1)
24
r1:
h1
h2
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4:
h2
h3
h1:
r1
r2
r3
r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r1
r6
(
r4
r5)
r6: h1
h2
h3: r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), (r3, h3), (r4, h2), (r6, h2)}
(size
5
)
HRT: stable matching
(2)
25
r1:
h1
h2
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2
h3
h1:
r1
r2
r3
r5 r6
r5:
h2
h1
h2: r2 r1
r6
(r4
r5
)
r6: h1
h2
h3:
r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
M = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1), (r3, h3), (r4, h3), (r5, h2), (r6, h2)}
(size
6
)
Maximum stable matchings
26
Master lists
27
[Irving, M and Scott, 2008]
MAX HRT: approximability
28
Integer Programming for
MAX HRT
29
Tutorial Outline
30
1.1: Classical Hospitals / Residents
problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents
problem with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
Couples in HR
31
(r1,r2): (h1,h2) h1:1: r1 r3 r2
r3:
(
h1
h2 h2:1:
r1 r3
r2
Couples in HR
32
(r1,r2): (h1,h2) h1:1: r1 r3 r2
r3:
(
h1
h2 h2:1:
r1 r3
r2
Couples in HR
33
(r1,r2): (h1,h2) h1:1: r1 r3 r2
r3:
(
h1
h2 h2:1:
r1 r3
r2
Couples in HR
34
[Ng and Hirschberg,
1988; Ronn, 1990]
[M and McBride, 2013]
Algorithm for HRC
35
Algorithm C: example
36
Resident preferences
r3 : h1 h5
r7 : h6 h8
(r1,r5) : (h1,h2) (h3,h6)
(r2,r4) : (h4,h5) (h1,h2) (h3,h7)
(r6,r8) :
(h6,h8)
Hospital preferences derived from the following master list:
r1
r2 r3
r4 r5 r6
r7 r8
Each hospital has capacity
1
cycle
Stable matching
37
Resident preferences
r3 : h1 h5
r7 : h6 h8
(r1,r5) : (h1,h2) (h3,h6)
(r2,r4) : (h4,h5) (h1,h2) (h3,h7)
(r6,r8) :
(h6,h8)
Hospital preferences
r1
r2 r3
r4 r5 r6
r7 r8
Each hospital has capacity
1
Stable matching:
M = {(r1, h3), (r2, h1), (r3, h5), (r4, h2), (r5, h6), (r7, h8)}
Empirical evaluation
38
Integer Programming for
HRC
39
Scottish Foundation Allocation
Scheme
40
The outcome
41
Tutorial Outline
42
1.1: Classical Hospitals / Residents
problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
r1: h1 h2 h1: r1 r2
r2: h1
2
h2: r1
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
44
r1: h1 h2 h1: r1 r2
r2: h1
1
h2:
r1
r1
r2
h1
h2
r1: h1 h2 h1: r1 r2
r2: h1
2
h2: r1
r1
r2
h1
h2
stable matching
maximum matching
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
r1: h4 h1 h3 h1: r4 r1 r2
r2: h2 h1 h4 h2: r3 r2 r4
r3: h2 h4 h3 h3: r1 r3
r4: h1 h4 h2 h4: r4 r1 r3 r2
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
r1: h4 h1 h3 h1: r4 r1 r2
r2: h2 h1 h4 h2: r3 r2 r4
r3: h2 h4 h3 h3: r1 r3
r4: h1 h4 h2 h4: r4 r1 r3 r2
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
r1: h4 h1 h3 h1: r4 r1 r2
r2: h2 h1 h4 h2: r3 r2 r4
r3: h2 h4 h3 h3: r1 r3
r4: h1 h4 h2 h4: r4 r1 r3 r2
Maximum matchings vs
stable matchings
r1: h4 h1 h3 h1: r4 r1 r2
r2: h2 h1 h4 h2: r3 r2 r4
r3: h2 h4 h3 h3: r1 r3
r4: h1 h4 h2 h4: r4 r1 r3 r2
“Almost stable” matchings
Tutorial Outline
50
1.1: Classical Hospitals / Residents
problem
1.2: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Ties
1.3: Hospitals / Residents problem
with Couples
1.4:
“Almost stable” matchings
1.5: Social Stability
The Social Network Graph
51
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
Social network graph
G
Residents
Hospitals
Example
52
r1: h2 h1
r2: h1 h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1 h3
r4: h2 h3
h1: r1 r3 r2 r5 r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2 r6 r1 r4 r5
r6: h1 h2
h3:
r4 r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
Social network graph
G
Residents
Hospitals
Example
53
r1:
h2
h1
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2
h3
h1: r1 r3
r2 r5
r6
r5: h2
h1
h2: r2
r6 r1
r4 r5
r6: h1
h2
h3:
r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
Social network graph
G
Residents
Hospitals
Social stability
54
Socially stable matchings
of different sizes
55
r1:
h2
h1
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3: h1
h3
r4: h2
h3
h1: r1 r3
r2 r5
r6
r5: h2
h1
h2: r2
r6 r1
r4 r5
r6: h1
h2
h3:
r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
Social network graph
G
Residents
Hospitals
Socially stable matchings
of different sizes
56
r1:
h2
h1
r2:
h1
h2
Each hospital has capacity
2
r3:
h1
h3
r4: h2
h3
h1: r1
r3
r2
r5
r6
r5: h2 h1
h2: r2
r6 r1
r4 r5
r6: h1
h2
h3:
r4
r3
Resident preferences Hospital preferences
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
Social network graph
G
Residents
Hospitals
Algorithmic results
57
Open problems
58
Further reading
59
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60
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