Home > 1. The Market Economy
1.
The Market Economy
Fall 2008
Outline
A.
Introduction
Economics is based on assumptions of maximization and equilibrium:
We build models who gets what and why they get it. (How resources are allocated.)
These have testable implications.
Key
themes
Incentives: Why do optimizers do what they do?
Information: What do individuals
know and is this useful?
Surprising idea: Individual
optimization can promote the common good. (In certain cases.)
Markets and other domains
where individuals interact aggregate individual’s decisions and information.
Pareto
Efficiency
Definition: An allocation of resources is Pareto
Efficient if it is
not possible to reallocate resources to make everyone better off.
How do we measure better off?
We use Utility to measure welfare/happiness.
Utility
Possibilities: What is Feasible
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
Utility
Possibilities: What is Feasible
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
Allocations
Pareto
efficiency: There is no waste
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
Pareto efficient Allocation
Equity:
equal shares
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
U1 = U2
Utilitarianism:
Maximize U(1)+U(2)
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
Rawls:
Maximize min{U(1),U(2)}
1’s Utility
2’s Utility
Example:
Efficiency in Exchange
A buyer values the good at 4 (and gets 0 otherwise).
A seller who values the good at 2 (and gets 0 otherwise).
They can trade at the price
p.
Buyer Seller
Seller keeps the good no trade 0 2
Buyer pays seller p and 4-p p
buyer gets the good
Q: What values of p is trade better than no trade?
B.
The Supply and Demand Fable
Suppose you have:
Your job is to decide who
should get a cup and who should make it.
What do you want to avoid:
(1) A $5 buyer not getting a coffee but a $1 buyer getting one.
(allocative inefficiency)
(2) A $1 seller not making a coffee but a $5 seller getting one.
(production inefficiency)
(3) A $3 seller providing coffee to a $2 buyer. (over provision)
(4) A $4 buyer not getting a coffee although there are sellers with $2 costs not making coffees. (under provision)
(5) Some coffee not being consumed by anyone.
Possible
mechanisms
(1) Central Planning/Fiat: (Centralized)
Tell
people what to do. (After first having tried to find out what
people want.) Likely to fail all the above tests.
(2) Organize an Auction (Centralized)
Tell
buyers and sellers to submit bids – likely to fail all tests.
(3) Organize a Market (Centralized & Decentralized)
Call
out a price for coffee.
(4) Put them all in a room and let them get on with it!
(Decentralized)
P
Q of Coffee
Demand (100)
P
Q of Coffee
Supply (80)
P
Q of Coffee
Demand
Supply
P
Q of Coffee
Demand
Supply
P
Q of Coffee
Demand
Supply
P
Q of Coffee
Demand
Supply
P
Q of Coffee
Demand
Supply
Conclusions
If
then
full efficiency is achieved.
C.
Efficiency of Economies with Many Goods (No Production)
Consumer Behaviour with Many
Goods
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
C.
Efficiency with Many Goods
Indifference Curves
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
utility =2
C.
Efficiency with Many Goods
Indifference Curves
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
utility =3
C.
Efficiency with Many Goods
indifference curves
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
utility =4
C.
Efficiency with Many Goods
Indifference Curves
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Higher Utility
Budget
Constraints
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
With $10 can afford 10 = pAX(Units
of A) + pBX(Units of B)
10 = pAQA + pB QB
Budget
Constraints
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
With $10 can afford 10 = pAX(Units of A) + pBX(Units of B)
Budget
Constraints
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
With $10 can afford 10 = pAX(Units of A) + pBX(Units of B)
Consumer
Optimum
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Consumer
Optimum
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Here Slopes are equal
Equal
Slopes
Slope of Budget Line:
= - pA /pB
Slope of Indifference Curve
= - MUA / MUB
Equal
Slopes
Slope of Budget Line:
= - pA /pB
Slope of Indifference Curve
= - MUA / MUB
This is called:
“The Marginal Rate of Substitution”
Equal
Slopes
Slope of Budget Line:
= - pA /pB
Slope of Indifference Curve
= - MUA / MUB
Equality Implies
MUA / MUB = pA /pB
Or
MUB/ pB = MUB /pB
Interpretation:
Extra utility from $1 = Extra utility from $1
spent on A spent on B
At
Last: Efficiency with Many Goods
Imagine 2 people: person I (she) and person II (he).
They begin life with:
Good A Good B
Person I 5 units 1 unit
Person II 1 unit 5 units
These are called endowments.
They want to trade to achieve better bundles.
Their
Resources
I’s Quantity of A
I’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
Their
Endowment
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
I’s
Preferences
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
II’s
Preferences
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Putting
Preferences together
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Is where cannot make I better off with out making II worse
off.
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Is where cannot make I better off with out making II worse
off.
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Is where cannot make I better off with out making II worse
off.
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Is where cannot make I better off with out making II worse
off.
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Is where cannot make I better off with out making II worse
off.
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Allocation
of Resources is efficient if
Slope
of I’s
Indifference = Slope of II’s Indifference Curve Curve
I’s MRS = II’s
MRS
MU(I)A / MU(I)B = MU(II)A / MU(II)B
Or
MU(I)A
/ MU(II)A = MU(I)B
/ MU(II)B
Extra utility I gets from Extra utility I gets from
small increase in A at the = small increase in B at the
expense of II’s small decrease expense of II’s small decrease
in A. in B.
All
the Pareto efficient places
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
These
join to give the Contract Curve
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Pareto
efficiency: Utility Possibilities
I’s Utility
II’s Utility
Pareto efficient Allocation
D.
Production Efficiency
One firm uses inputs:
Land and Labour to produce good A
Another firm:
uses Land and Labour to produce good
B.
Production
Functions & Isoquants
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 1 Unit of A
Production
Functions & Isoquants
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 1 Unit of A
Output = 2 Unit of A
Production
Functions & Isoquants
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 1 Unit of A
Output = 3 Unit of A
Output = 2 Unit of A
Production
Functions & Isoquants
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 1 Unit of A
Output = 3 Unit of A
Output = 2 Unit of A
Output = 5 Unit of A
Output = 4 Unit of A
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
$8 = PL QL+ PN PN
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
$9 = PL
QL+ PN PN
$8 = PL QL+ PN PN
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
$10 = PL
QL+ PN PN
$9 = PL
QL+ PN PN
$8 = PL QL+ PN PN
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 3 Unit of A
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Output = 3 Unit of A
Most
Efficient way of producing Output =3
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Here Slopes are equal
Output = 3 Unit of A
SLOPES
ARE EQUAL SO:
Slope of Isoquant
= - MPN /MPL
= “Marginal rate of technical substitution”
Slope of Cost Line
= - PN /PL
Equal Slopes MPN /MPL = PN /PL
or
MPN /PN = MPL /PL
Production
Functions & Isoquants
Quantity of Labour
Quantity of land
Here Slopes are equal
Output = 1 Unit of A
Output = 3 Unit of A
Output = 2 Unit of A
Output = 5 Unit of A
Output = 4 Unit of A
Many
Firms Producing
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
Many
Firms Producing
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
Many
Firms Producing: Efficient Production
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
SLOPES
ARE EQUAL SO:
Slope of Isoquant Firm I
= - MP(I)N /MP(I)L
= “Marginal rate tech substitution (I)”
Slope of Isoquant Firm II
= - MP(II)N /MP(II)L
= “Marginal rate tech substitution (I)”
Equal Slopes MP(I)N /MP(I)L = MP(II)N /MP(II)L
or
MP(I)N /MP(II)N = MP(I)L /MP(II)L
Many
Firms Producing: Efficient Production
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
Production
Possibility Frontier
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
Production
Possibilities: What is Feasible
Firm 1’s Output
Firm 2’s Output
Production
Possibilities: What is Feasible
Firm 1’s Output
Firm 2’s Output
Slope of this line represents how economy is able to move from production of 2 into 1 =
Marginal Rate of Transformation
At
Last: Production Efficiency with Many Goods and One Consumer
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Higher Utility
How the consumer values goods
What
can be produced
Firm 1’s Output
Firm 2’s Output
Maximizing
Utility given Production
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Higher Utility
How the consumer values goods
Slope
of Indifference = Slope of Production Possibilities = Ratio of Prices
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
Higher Utility
How the consumer values goods
Efficiency
with Many Goods and Production
Slope of Indifference = Marginal
Rate of Substitution
Equals
Slope of Production Possibilities = Marginal Rate of Transformation
Equals
Ratio of Prices
Efficiency
with Many Goods and Production
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
Many
Firms Producing: What is produced is determined by input prices
Firm 1’s Labour
Firm 1’s Land
1
5
Firm II’s Land
Firm II’s Labour
1
5
Their
Preferences
Quantity of A
Quantity of B
1
5
II’s Quantity of B
II’s Quantity of A
1
5
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