Bank of Japan May 2009
1
[Chart 1] Economic Growth and Inflation
(Percentage change from previous year��
Year
Real
GNP
GNP
Deflator
Remarks
1914-19
6.2
13.6 World War I Boom
1920-29
1.8
-1.3 Chronic Recession
1930-31
0.7
-10.3 Showa Depression
1932-36
6.1
1.5 Takahashi Economic Policy
1937-40
5
11.9 Wartime command economy
Source: Ohkawa, Kazushi, Nobukiyo Takamatsu, and Yuzo Yamamoto
(1974),
Estimates of Long-Term Economic Statistics of Japan
since 1868, 1, National Income.
The Japanese economy during the interwar period faced chronic crises. Among them, the Showa
Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of 1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa
Financial Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent financial instability because of the
incomplete restructuring in the business sector and postponements in the disposal of bad loans by
financial institutions. The crisis brought reforms in the financial sector through large-scale injections of
public funds and the amalgamation of banks. The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the
Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse, which had been intensified in Japan by the return to
the Gold Standard at the old parity. Japan escaped from the Great Depression earlier than most other
countries through a series of macroeconomic stimulus measures initiated by Korekiyo Takahashi, a
veteran Finance Minister who resumed office in December 1931. Takahashi instituted comprehensive
macroeconomic policy measures, including exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary adjustments. At the
same time, the Gold Standard, which had been governing Japan��s fiscal policy, collapsed in the wake of
the British departure from it in September 1931. Then, Japan introduced a mechanism by which the
government could receive easy credit from the central bank without establishing other institutional
measures to govern its fiscal policy. This course of events resulted in an eventual loss of fiscal
discipline.
I. Introduction
The Japanese economy faced chronic crises during the
interwar period. Among the crises, the Showa
Financial Crisis of 1927 and the Showa Depression of
1930-31 marked turning points. The Showa Financial
Crisis of 1927 was the consequence of persistent
financial instability because of
incomplete
restructuring in the business sector and postponements
in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions.
The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was caused by the
Great Depression, a worldwide economic collapse
which had been intensified in Japan by the return to
the Gold Standard at the old parity in January 1930.
We divide the period from the outbreak of the
First World War (1914) to that of the Second World
War (1939) into five sub-periods (Chart 1). The first
sub-period was an economic boom with high rates of
growth and inflation, from 1914 to 1919. This was
followed by about a decade of dull, mildly
deflationary activity (1920-29). In 1930 and 1931, the
economy succumbed to the Showa Depression, a
two-year bout of severe deflation and economic
decline. From 1932 to 1936, the economy recovered
under the ��Takahashi Economic Policy�� (
Takahashi
Zaisei), achieving high growth and modest inflation.1
Then, from 1937, Japan entered the era of the
command economy of the Asia-Pacific War,
embarking on several years of high growth and
rampant inflation.2
This paper gives an overview of the Japanese
economy during the interwar period. We focus on the
policy responses to the instability of the domestic
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2009-J-1
The Japanese Economy during the Interwar Period:
Instability in the Financial System and
the Impact of the World Depression
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies
Masato Shizume
May 2009
2009-E-2
Bank of Japan May 2009
2
[Chart 2] Chronology of the Financial Crises
of the 1920s
Year
Date
Event
1920 7-Apr
Masuda Bill-Broker Bank fails.
1922 28-Feb
Ishii Corporation fails.
19-Oct
Nippon Commerce and Industrial Bank in
Kyoto suspends operations.
29-Nov
Nippon Sekizen Bank in Kyoto announces a
suspension of operations, a move which
triggers bank panic in the Kyoto and Nara
regions.
30-Nov
Kyushu Bank in Kumamoto announces a
suspension of operations.
1923 1-Sep
The Great Kanto Earthquake
27-Sep
The Diet promulgates the imperial emergency
ordinance, a legislation to indemnify the losses
incurred by the Bank of Japan through the
rediscounting of the Earthquake Casualty Bills
(ECBs).
1927 26-Jan
New legislation to adjust the ECBs is
submitted to the Diet.
14-Mar
Finance Minister Kataoka misstates the failure
of Tokyo Watanabe Bank.
23-Mar
The Diet approves the new legislation to adjust
the ECBs.
30-Mar
The Banking Act of 1927 is proclaimed (to
take effect on January 1, 1928).
17-Apr
The Privy Council rejects the imperial
emergency ordinances for relief of the Bank of
Taiwan.
18-Apr
The Bank of Taiwan suspends operations
outside of Taiwan Island.
21-Apr
The Fifteenth Bank suspends operations.
22-Apr
The Diet proclaims an imperial emergency
ordinance for a 3-week moratorium.
8-May
The Diet passes and promulgates the Bank of
Japan's Special Credit Bill and the Financial
Relief Bill for Taiwanese Banks.
Sources: Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan
[1993],
Nihon Kin��yu Nenpyo (Chronology of Financial Matters
in Japan);
Nippon Ginko Hyakunen-Shi (Bank of Japan: The
First Hundred Years), Vol. 3.
financial system in the 1920s and to the impact of the
Great Depression of the 1930s.
II��
Chronic Financial Crises and Policy
Responses in the 1920s
The Japanese economy of the 1920s suffered from a
retrenchment after the boom of the First World War.
For most of the decade, the real economy remained
dull, with low economic growth, mild deflation, and
an unsettled financial system. Some observers
describe the economic condition in Japan during the
1920s as a state of ��chronic depression.��3 The Showa
Financial Crisis of 1927 marked a turning point for the
disposal of bad loans and the restructuring of the
banking sector, which eventually resolved the
problems with the domestic financial system (See
Chart 2 for the chronology).
A. Post-War Collapse in 1920
In March 1920, stock prices plunged as investors
anticipated a hard-landing for the Japanese economy
after the boom of the First World War. In April 1920,
Masuda Bill Broker Bank in Osaka failed, triggering a
bank run in several regions throughout Japan. The
bank had been engaged in the intermediation of
interbank transactions, and its customers had included
both local banks and large city banks. Then, over the
next four months, from April to July 1920, operations
were suspended at 21 banks, either permanently or
temporarily.4 The Bank of Japan (BOJ) extended
various types of ��special loans�� to ease tensions
within the financial markets in general and stabilize
financial markets by relieving specific key industries.5
B. Financial Panic of 1922
Ishii Corporation, a lumber company engaged in
speculative activities, went bankrupt at the end of
February 1922, triggering bank runs in Kochi
Prefecture (in southwestern part of Japan) and Kansai
region (Osaka, Kyoto and their environs). Then, from
October through December 1922, bank runs spread far
across the country, from Kyushu (the westernmost part
of Japan) through Kanto (Tokyo and its environs in
eastern Japan). In 1922, operations were suspended at
15 banks, either permanently or temporarily. The BOJ
extended ��special loans�� to 20 banks from December
1922 to April 1923.
The government tightened regulations on
small-sized saving banks by enacting the Saving Bank
Act of 1921. Next, it tried to accelerate reforms in the
financial system as a whole, including the larger-sized
ordinary banks.6
C. ��Special Loans�� after the Great Kanto
Earthquake of 1923
The Great Kanto Earthquake in September 1923 hurt
the financial system in Japan, damaging the financial
assets of banks, as well as their physical capital such
as the bank headquarters buildings and branches.
Depositors feared bank losses and delays in the
repayment of bank loans.
On September 7, the government promulgated an
emergency ordinance to impose a moratorium, which
allowed for the postponement of payments due from
that month onward in the districts affected. As events
transpired, the BOJ made special arrangements,
including ��special loans.�� Then, on September 27, the
government promulgated another emergency
ordinance to indemnify the BOJ for any losses
Bank of Japan May 2009
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incurred in the re-discounting of bills and certain other
papers payable in the stricken areas (Earthquake
Casualty Bills, or ECBs), to a ceiling of 100 million
yen.7
Depositors were relieved by these special measures
of the government and BOJ. By the time the
moratorium was lifted in October 1923, financial
turbulence had been curbed. Meanwhile, large
portions of the ECBs had yet to be settled. After two
postponements of the due date for settlement, the date
was finally set for September 30, 1927.
D. The Showa Financial Crisis of 1927
In January 1927, the Wakatsuki Cabinet of the ruling
Kensei-kai Party took a step to facilitate the final
disposition of the bad debts incurred by the Great
Kanto Earthquake by submitting legislation to the Diet
requiring adjustments of the ECBs. This legislation
allowed the government to issue bonds which could
be exchanged with the ECBs. On March 14, in the
courses of heated debate on the government��s
measures in the Diet, Finance Minister Naoharu
Kataoka falsely declared that the Tokyo Watanabe
Bank had failed (the bank had not yet failed at the
time of this declaration). This statement set off a surge
of financial panic in the regions surrounding the two
great metropolises, Tokyo and Osaka. On March 23,
the Diet approved the legislation, temporarily calming
the depositors�� panic.
A nationwide financial panic was sparked when
debates in the Diet revealed financial difficulties
between the Bank of Taiwan and Suzuki & Co., a big
trading house based in Kobe. The Bank of Taiwan had
a monopoly in issuing bank notes on Taiwan Island,
and close business ties with Suzuki & Co. In response,
the Cabinet tried to issue an emergency ordinance
authorizing the BOJ to send the Bank of Taiwan relief
funds, and indemnifying the BOJ for any losses
incurred by this action up to a ceiling of 200 million
yen. The Privy Council, the body invested with the
authority to approve the emergency ordinance,
politicized the Cabinet��s plan and rejected it on April
17. The Wakatsuki Cabinet resigned and financial
panic spread nationwide.8
On April 20, 1927, Giichi Tanaka of the
opposition
Seiyu-kai Party took office. Korekiyo
Takahashi became Finance Minister for the fourth
time, and the government proclaimed an emergency
ordinance imposing a three-week moratorium,
effective from April 22 to May 12. Next, the Diet
convened an extraordinary session to deliberate on
two bills. The first was to authorize the BOJ to make
special advances under the government guarantee of
indemnity against consequent loss, up to a maximum
of 500 million yen (the Bank of Japan��s Special Credit
Bill). The second was to accommodate financial
institutions on the Island of Taiwan under a
government guarantee of indemnity against the
consequent loss, up to a maximum of 200 million yen
(the Financial Relief Bill for Taiwanese Banks). These
two bills, passed and promulgated on May 8, proved
sufficiently reassuring to quell the panic. The
moratorium was lifted on May 13.9
III. Reforms in the Banking System
A. Banking Act of 1927 and Reforms in the
Financial System
Major progress towards the resolution of the financial
crises of the 1920s took place in 1927, when structural
reforms in the banking sector gained momentum in
[Chart 3] Number of Banks and
Year-to-Year Changes
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
1901
1906
1911
1916
1921
1926
1931
1936
1941
-3000
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
setting up (left ecale)
closing down (left scale)
amalgamation (left scale)
number of banks (right scale)
end of year
year-to-year changes
Source: Goto [1970]
[Chart 4] Tokyo Call Rate and
Official Discount Rate of BOJ
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937
Call (lowest)
Call (highest)
ODR
%
Source: Ministry of Finance,
Kin��yu Jiko Sanko-Sho (Reference Book
of Financial Matters), annual editions.
* Shadowing indicates periods of spread financial panics.
Bank of Japan May 2009
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step with measures to dispose of the bad loans. The
new Banking Act was promulgated on March 30, 1927,
in the midst of the Showa Financial Crisis, with plans
for effectuation on January 1, 1928. The Act stipulated
minimum capital requirements for banks and
prohibited banks and bank managers from conducting
most non-banking businesses. Under this Act, the
authorities reinforced the bank examination and
encouraged amalgamation of banks to stabilize the
financial system as a whole. The number of banks
declined steadily through the 1920s, and the trend
accelerated in 1927 with an increase in mergers (Chart
3) .10
Chart 4 shows developments in the call rates, the
referenced interest rates for short-term interbank
transactions of funds, and the official discount rate
(ODR) of the BOJ. Call rates remained high between
the financial panic of 1922 and the Showa Financial
Crisis of 1927, reflecting a high risk premium. A
number of banks with high risk profiles, such as the
Bank of Taiwan, tried to raise funds in the interbank
market over that period. Aware of the credit risk of the
distressed banks and instability in the financial market
in general, lenders required high risk premiums.11
Call rates decreased substantially in the spring of
1927, as market participants gained confidence from
the new Banking Act, the disposition of the Showa
Financial Crisis, and the stabilizing financial markets.
B. Causes and Consequences of the
Financial Instability of the 1920s
Many observers argue that the financial instability of
the 1920s was fundamentally caused by incomplete
restructuring in the business sector and postponement
in the disposal of bad loans by financial institutions
after the economic boom of the First World War.
The prominent economist Eigo Fukai, then an
Executive Director of the BOJ and later the bank��s
Governor, wrote :
In summing up the fundamental causes of
massive bank failures in 1927, we can
conclude that the original sources were the
inappropriate business practices during the
post-war collapse and the temporary stop-gap
measures to fix them. Ultimately, it all came to
the inevitable end.12
Kamekichi Takahashi, another prominent
economist and ex-editor of
Toyo Keizai Shinpo (the
Oriental Economist), wrote:
The fundamental causes of the Financial Crisis
of 1927 were the cumulative mismanagement
of cover-ups and halfway measures against
earlier flaws dating back to the post-war
collapse. These problems were revealed
inadvertently during the debate on ECBs,
igniting the explosion of the financial crisis.13
The unimaginable financial panic induced
drastic reforms in the banking system, whether
people liked it or not. The panic contributed to
many of the reforms that were to follow.14
Kamekichi Takahashi also argued that the reforms
of the domestic financial system after the Showa
Financial Crisis of 1927 helped Japan respond
effectively to the Great Depression in the 1930s:
A number of leading industrial countries
suffered from the World Financial Crisis, a
financial collapse without precedent, in the
third quarter of 1931 (in the case of the United
States, the crisis hit in the first quarter of 1933).
For many years to follow, the economic
activities of these countries were severely
disrupted by the financial collapse. Yet Japan
remained immune to the financial crisis of the
1930s, enjoying the benefits of the policy
changes and the depreciation of the yen�� This
could be credited to the total restructuring of
Japan��s banking system in the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 1927.15
To sum up, Japan faced serious financial difficulties
during the 1920s. The government instituted policies
on two fronts to surmount these difficulties in the
years during and after the Financial Crisis of 1927: the
massive injection of public funds by indemnifying
against lending losses of the central bank, and
structural reforms in the banking sector through the
promotion of bank amalgamation and other measures
of that sort.
IV. Return to the Gold Standard and the
Showa Depression of 1930-31
A. Returning to the Gold Standard
After the First World War, leaders around the world
sought to restore the suspended international gold
standard and reconstruct the European economy.
Major countries such as the United States (June 1919)
and the United Kingdom (April 1925) returned to the
gold standard.
Japan chose not to join the other major countries in
Bank of Japan May 2009
5
returning to gold during the 1920s. Policymakers
debated whether to do so on at least three occasions,
in 1919, 1923, and 1927. From a policy perspective,
Japan had three options: a) the immediate restoration
of the gold standard at the old parity, a move which
would push the yen up from its present level; b) an
eventual move to gold at the old parity, with sufficient
time for preparation in advance; and c) a move to gold
at a new parity, to keep the yen cheaper than it had
been at the old parity. In all three of the policy debates
referred to above, Japan chose to postpone the return
to the gold standard.16
Japan had good reasons for not returning to the
gold standard. Apart from instability in the domestic
financial system, policymakers feared that Japan
might be unable to sustain gold parity even after
returning to the gold standard.
Japan recorded a persistent trade deficit during the
1920s after enjoying a massive trade surplus during
the First World War. By running the trade deficit, the
nation was losing the specie and foreign reserves it
had accumulated during the War. The sum of the
specie and foreign reserves decreased from 2,179
million yen (13.7 percent of GNP) at the end of 1920
to 1,199 million yen (7.3 percent of GNP) at the end
of 1928.17
Japan��s persistent trade deficit of the 1920s was a
consequence of waning competitiveness due to the
high prices of domestic goods compared to foreign
goods. Tracing the wholesale price index of Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, we find that
prices in these three countries moved together at
stable levels up to 1913, surged during and just after
the First World War, and then plunged, albeit to a
lesser extent in Japan. The price gap between Japan
and its trading partners remained through to the end of
the 1920s (Chart 5).
Aware that the gap between domestic and foreign
prices was eroding the competitiveness of domestic
industries, Japanese policymakers and business
leaders sought to narrow the price gap and restore the
gold standard.18
When the Hamaguchi Cabinet of the
Minsei-to
(ex-
Kensei-Kai) Party came into power in July 1929,
it was committed to the lifting of the gold embargo.
Jun��nosuke Inoue, Hamaguchi��s finance minister had
put in a long career in international finance.19 Judging
from the restored stability in the domestic financial
system, he concluded that the key precondition for
returning to the gold standard had been satisfied. After
cutting the budget for fiscal 1929 and 1930, he lifted
the gold embargo in January 1930.
In retrospect, we see that the gold embargo was
lifted in 1930 just when the Great Depression spread
and deepened around the globe. Thus, the Japanese
economy suffered debilitating effects from two
sources, the impact of the worldwide depression and
the appreciation of the yen associated with the return
to the gold standard. The consequences, economically,
were abrupt deflation and a severe contraction of
economic activities in 1930 and 1931. Future
observers were to call this ��the Showa Depression.��
The Showa Depression of 1930-31 was of a
fundamentally different nature than the crises of the
1920s. The crises of the earlier decade had been
problems of the domestic financial system. The Showa
Depression of 1930-31, on the other hand, was
induced by external factors, such as imported
deflation, in combination with the appreciating
currency and falling overseas demand.
When the United Kingdom departed from the gold
standard in September 1931, international investors
speculated that Japan would also be forced to follow
suit soon. A rush to sell yen and buy dollars led to a
massive outflow of capital. Finance Minister Inoue
announced that the government would stay on the
gold standard, and the BOJ raised the discount rate
twice, in October and November. These measures
failed, however, to bring about their desired effects:
[Chart 5] Prices and Exchange Rates
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940
wholesale price index
(1913=100)
exchenge rate (percent
change from 1913 level)
First World War
"Showa
Depression"
"theTakahashi
Economic
Policy"
Japan
the United States
Great
Britain
yen-to-sterling
yen-to-dollar
Sources: Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan [1987],
Hundred-Year Statistics of Wholesale Price Indexes in Japan;
Asahi Shinbun Sha [1930],
Nippon Keizai Toukei Soran
(Pandect of Economic Statistics of Japan); Ministry of Finance,
Financial Bureau [annual editions],
Kin'yu Jiko Sanko Sho
(Reference Book of Financial Matters); U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census [1949],
Historical Statistics
of the United States; B. R. Mitchell [1988],
British Historical
Statistics.
Bank of Japan May 2009
6
the capital outflow continued until December, when
the
Minsei-to Cabinet20 collapsed and the opposition
Seiyu-kai Party came into power.
B. Departure from the Gold Standard and the
Start of the ��Takahashi Economic policy��
On December 13, 1931, when Tsuyoshi Inukai of the
Seiyu-kai Party came to power, veteran Korekiyo
Takahashi came back as Finance Minister for the fifth
time in his career. Takahashi ordered a gold embargo
on the day of his return to office. He went on to
implement a series of economic policy adjustments
over the next four years, until February 1936, when he
was assassinated by militarists. His policy regime has
since been referred to as the ��Takahashi economic
policy.�� As we see below, this was a three-pronged
macroeconomic policy with exchange rate, monetary,
and fiscal dimensions.
First, under the exchange rate policy, the yen was
allowed to depreciate by 60 percent against the U.S.
dollar and by 44 percent against the pound sterling,
from December 1931 to November 1932. 21
Perceiving that a further depreciation of the yen would
be unfavorable to the Japanese economy, the
government took steps to stabilize the exchange rate.
From April 1933, Yokohama Specie Bank, the official
foreign exchange bank of Japan, set the exchange rate
quotation in pound sterling, effectively pegging the
yen to sterling. Meanwhile, foreign-exchange and
capital controls in Japan remained mild through 1936.
22
Second, fiscal expenditures increased, backed by
deficit financing with the central bank��s credit. A
newspaper reported that Takahashi had mentioned the
BOJ underwriting of government bonds for the first
time on March 8, 1932, at a meeting with financiers.23
On June 3, the government submitted a bill to issue
deficit-covering bonds, together with a supplemental
budget outlaying expenditures for military action in
Manchuria (Northeastern part of Chinese Continent)
and for an emergency relief program in rural areas.
Then, on the same day, Takahashi officially
announced the BOJ underwriting of government
bonds. The bill and supplemental budget passed on
June 18, marking a full-fledged start of the stimulative
fiscal policy of the Takahashi era. The BOJ started
underwriting government bonds on November 25,
1932.
Third, the BOJ conducted an accommodative
monetary policy by cutting its official discount rate in
March, June, and August 1932. Meanwhile, the
regulation on bank note issuance was amended in June
to raise the limit of fiduciary note issuance from 120
million yen to 1 billion yen.
V. Transmission Mechanism of the
Takahashi Economic Policy
A number of observers who focus on the
macroeconomic aspects of the Takahashi economic
policy praise Takahashi��s achievements as a successful
pioneer of Keynesian economics. Kindleberger points
out that Takahashi conducted quintessential Keynesian
policies, stating, ��his writing of the period showed
that he already understood the mechanism of the
Keynesian multiplier, without any indication of
contact with the R. F. Kahn 1931
Economic Journal
article.��24
The gist of this argument is that the macroeconomic
stimulus policies during the Takahashi era contributed
to growth in aggregate demand in Japan, and that
Takahashi��s macroeconomic policy consisted of a
combination of three elements: a) depreciation of the
yen (exchange rate policy), b) increase in government
expenditure associated with the underwriting of
deficit-covering bonds by the BOJ (fiscal policy), and
c) interest rate cut (monetary policy).
Next, we compare economic performances of
peripheral countries during the Great Depression in
[Chart 6] Production and Price
Indexes
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
Industrial Production (percent change from previous year)
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
gold standard countries
exchange control countries
sterling area countries
other depreciators
Japan
Wholesale Price (percent change from previous year)
Source: League of Nations[1940],
Statistical Year-Book of the League of
Nations, 1939/40, pp.194-204.
Bank of Japan May 2009
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the 1930s. The peripheral countries at that time,
countries similar to Japan as small and open
economies, are divided into four categories: a) gold
standard countries, b) exchange control countries, c)
sterling area countries, and d) other depreciators.25
Japan recovered earlier than these other peripheral
countries: production and prices rose in Japan
year-on-year by as early as 1932 (Chart 6).
Now, we review previous works done by
economic historians and economists, focusing on the
transmission mechanism of the Takahashi economic
policy.
Nakamura [1983] employs a pioneering
quantitative analysis focusing on the effect of the
Takahashi policy on macroeconomic stability.
Through this analysis, he concludes that the
combination of exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary
policies contributed to stability of the Japanese
economy.
Since then, many scholars have focused on the
direct effects of Takahashi��s policies on demand and
prices. Often they argue that external factors such as
exchange rate movements played a pivotal role behind
the increases in demand and prices. Nanto and Takagi
[1985] emphasize the effects of the yen depreciation.26
Okura and Teranishi [1994] discuss the effects of the
move into Manchuria and fiscal stimulus, as well as
the yen depreciation.27 Umeda [2006] employs a
vector-auto-regression (VAR) analysis with the
following six variables: Japanese wholesale price
index (WPI), foreign WPI, effective exchange rate,
real fiscal expenditure (deflated by WPI), monetary
base, and output gap (approximated by the deviation
from the trend of production index). He finds, as a
result, that Japanese prices were more strongly
influenced by foreign prices and exchange rates than
by domestic monetary and fiscal variables.28 Cha
[2003], on the other hand, stresses the important role
of fiscal stimulus.29
Though recent research has examined how policy
changes influence the expectation of future prices,
many aspects of the transmission mechanism through
this channel remain to be explored.
Empirical evidence shows a shift in expectation
from deflation to inflation about the time when
Takahashi commenced his economic policy. Yet the
factors behind this shift in expectations remain unclear.
Some argue that two events, namely, the departure
from the gold standard (in December 1931) and the
underwriting of government bonds by the BOJ
(reported in March and commenced in November
1932), marked the turning points.30 There is evidence
to suggest, however, that market expectations were
influenced significantly only by the departure from the
gold standard, and not by the BOJ��s underwriting of
government bonds.31
Next, we compare macroeconomic policy between
Japan and other peripheral countries during the Great
Depression of the 1930s (Chart 7).
First, in exchange rate policy, Japan��s currency
depreciated more sharply than the other currencies in
1932, then moved in parallel with the currencies of the
[Chart 7] Macroeconomic Policies of Japan and
Other Countries
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
Exchange Rates (gold parity in 1930=100)
-60
-40
-20
0
20
1929
1931
1933
1935
1937
Fiscal Banlance of the Central Government (ratio to revenue)
%
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
gold standard countries
exchange control countries
sterling area countries
other depreciators
Japan
Currency in Circulation
(percent change from previous year)
Sources: League of Nations[1940],
Statistical Year-Book of the League of
Nations, 1939/40, pp.194-204; Economic Intelligence Service, League of
Nations [1937-38],
Public Finance.
Bank of Japan May 2009
8
sterling area countries.
Second, in fiscal policy, Japan recorded much
larger fiscal deficits than the other countries
throughout Takahashi��s term as Finance Minister in
the 1930s.
Third, in monetary policy, currency in circulation
(a measure of the quantity of money supply) rose
moderately in Japan, as in sterling area countries,
throughout Takahashi��s term, and thus was no
exception. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan reduced its
official interest rate three times in 1932, following the
central banks of the United Kingdom and the United
States.32
VI. Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma: the
Japanese Case
Japan was a small, open economy during the entire
interwar period, including Takahashi��s term. The
economy depended heavily on overseas markets, both
in terms of trade and finance.
Policymakers and market participants at home
recognized the small scale and openness of the
economy. At the beginning of the Takahashi term,
Japan depreciated the yen to a sustainable level and
then pegged it to the pound sterling.
According to the notion of the macroeconomic
policy trilemma, any chosen macroeconomic policy
regime can succeed in achieving only two out of the
following three policy objectives:
a) independent monetary policy oriented toward
domestic objectives;
b) a fixed exchange rate; and
c) full freedom of cross-border capital
movements.33
During Takahashi��s term, Japan pegged its
currency to the currency of the United Kingdom, a
country which had been conducting a relatively lax
monetary policy, and left cross-border capital
regulations mild. 34 This implied that Japan was
obliged to follow the monetary policy of the United
Kingdom. Japan, meanwhile, increased its fiscal
spending.
Other countries, such as Sweden and Denmark,
chose options similar to Japan��s. Specifically, they
departed from the gold standard after the United
Kingdom, depreciated their currencies against the
pound sterling, and then pegged their currencies to the
pound sterling. Through this approach, they achieved
economic recovery earlier than the other European
countries during the Great Depression.35
VII. The Takahashi Economic Policy and
Fiscal Discipline
A number of previous works claim that the Takahashi
economic policy, especially the underwriting of
government bonds by the BOJ, led to easy credit for
the government from the central bank, and a loss of
fiscal discipline as a result.36
A number of recent studies discuss the issue of
fiscal discipline in relation to political economy and
international finance. Bordo and Rockoff [1996] argue
that adherence to the gold standard by peripheral
countries signaled prudent fiscal and monetary
policies and improved the access to capital from core
Western countries.37 Shizume [2007a], meanwhile,
observes that participation in international financial
markets worked as a governance mechanism for
maintaining fiscal discipline in Japan, even when
Japan suspended the gold standard in the 1920s. Yet
the British departure from the gold standard in
September 1931 was a clear sign of the breakdown of
the international gold standard: it eroded the rationale
for staying on the gold standard, and hence the
governance mechanism for fiscal policy through
international finance. Japan, having apparently failed
to establish a new governance mechanism for fiscal
policy, introduced a way for the central bank to
provide easy credit to the government.38
During Takahashi��s term, there was virtually no
formal mechanism for keeping the ever-growing
budget demand to fund the military in check.
Takahashi��s presence was an agent of fiscal discipline
in itself: the governance of fiscal policy depended on
his own capabilities and will.39 During the budgetary
process of fiscal 1936, the Ministry of Finance, under
Takahashi��s leadership, tried to reduce the fiscal
deficit. While it succeeded in reducing new
government bond issues to some degree, the reduction
was far from the level required. The negotiation
increased tensions with the military, paving the way to
Takahashi��s assassination by a group of militarists on
February 26, 1936. A complete loss of fiscal discipline
ensued as Japan moved to a wartime command
economy.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
We can draw a number of historical lessons from the
Japanese experience during the 1920s and 30s.
First, Japan was unable to correct the instability of
the financial system until the government adopted
decisive measures on two fronts in the face of the
Bank of Japan May 2009
9
financial crisis of 1927: the massive injection of
public funds by indemnifying against the losses of the
central bank, and structural reforms in the banking
sector through the promotion of bank amalgamation
and other measures of that sort.
Second, a combination of macroeconomic
stimulus policies provided an effective way to deal
with the world depression of the 1930s. Currency
depreciation, fiscal stimulus, and easy monetary
conditions helped Japan recover early from the Great
Depression. We can note here that the shift in
expectation from deflation to inflation was chiefly the
result of the currency depreciation, not the BOJ
underwriting of government bonds. The mechanism
by which the expectation was formed in Japan was
what we would expect in a small, open economy run
under a fixed exchange rate system.
Third, Takahashi��s regime lacked an
institutionalized mechanism to govern fiscal policy.
Fiscal discipline was maintained by the personal
capabilities and will of Takahashi himself. Japan
failed to establish a new mechanism to ensure fiscal
discipline. And Takahashi��s fiscal policy relied upon
easy credit to the government by the central bank
through the underwriting of government bonds. These
policy settings weakened the governance of fiscal
policy.
1
Korekiyo Takahashi (1854-1936) was a distinguished
financial and political leader in Japan. He joined the Bank of
Japan (BOJ) in 1892 and served as Governor of the Bank from
1911 to 1913. He then went on to serve as Finance Minister
seven times, between 1913 and 36, and as Prime Minister once,
from 1921 to 22. He was assassinated by a group of militarists
on February 26, 1936. Another distinction of his career in
public service was his central role as a fundraiser in the
Western countries during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05).
As we will learn later in this paper, Takahashi solved the
financial crisis of 1927 and implemented a dramatic economic
stimulus during the Great Depression.
2 In July 1937, Japan and China entered a state of war without
declaring it. Japan was at war from that month until its
surrender at the end of the Second World War in August 1945.
3 See Patrick, Hugh T. [1971], ��The Economic Muddle of the
1920s,�� Morley, James William, ed.,
Dilemmas of Growth in
Prewar Japan, Princeton University Press, pp.211-266,
Princeton. Others, such as Nakamura [1983], call the 1920s an
��era of unbalanced growth�� for Japan, emphasizing the surge of
urbanization and industrialization supported by public
investment. See Nakamura, Takafusa [1983],
Economic Growth
in Prewar Japan, Yale University Press, New Haven.
4 Masuda Bill Broker Bank was headquartered in Osaka and
had branches in the national and regional commercial centers of
Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Moji. See Tsurumi, Masayoshi
[2000] ��Senzen-ki ni okeru Kin��yu Kiki to Intaabanku Shijo no
Henbo (Financial Crises and Changes in the Interbank Money
Market during the Prewar Period),�� Itoh, Masanao, Masayoshi
Tsurumi, and Yoshio Asai, eds.,
Kin��yu Kiki to Kakushin:
Rekishi kara Gendai e (Financial Crises and Innovation: From
History to Present), Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, Tokyo,
pp.67-107; and Ehiro, Akira [2000], ��Kin��yu Kiki to Kouteki
Shikin Do��nyu: 1920 Nendai no Kin��yu Kiki eno Taiou
(Financial Crises and the Injection of Public Funds: Policy
Responses to the Financial Crises of the 1920s),�� Itoh, Tsurumi,
and Asai, eds., pp.67-107.
5 ��Special loans�� refer to various kinds of loans extended by
the BOJ with special arrangements. They include loans
exceeding a credit line per borrower, loans with extended
coverage of collateral, and loans to borrowers who have no
present ties to BOJ as clients.
6 See Tamaki, Norio [1995],
Japanese Banking: A History,
1859-1959, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.,
pp.141-142.
7 See Bank of Japan [1924],
Annual Report for the Year 1923,
Tokyo, p.V.
8 At the peak of panic on April 21, BOJ loans skyrocketed by
57 percent in just one day, to 602 million yen, and bank notes
in circulation increased by 38 percent in just one day, to 639
million yen.
9 See Bank of Japan [1928],
Annual Report for the Year 1927,
Tokyo, pp.II-III; Tamaki [1995], p.152. The total government
guarantees of 700 million yen accounted for 4.3 percent of the
Gross National Product.
10
See Tamaki [1995], pp.155-164. According to Goto,
Shin��ichi [1970],
Nihon no Kin��yu Toukei (Financial Statistics
in Japan), Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, the year-end number
of banks in Japan was 2,039 in the year 1920, and 1,427 in the
year 1927. Then it decreased by 265 in just one year, by the end
of 1928. In 1932, the number stood at 650.
11 See Tsurumi [2000], pp.100-101.
12 Fukai, Eigo [1941],
Kaiko Nanajunen (Reflections on
Seventy Years), Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, p.225.
13
Takahashi, Kamekichi [1955a],
Taisho Showa Zaikai
Hendou Shi (A History of Economic Fluctuations during Taisho
and Showa Eras), vol.2, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, p.739.
14 Takahashi, Kamekichi and Sunao Morigaki [1993],
Showa
Kin��yu Kyoko Shi (A History of the Showa Financial Crisis),
Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, p.289.
15
Takahashi, Kamekichi [1955b],
Taisho Showa Zaikai
Hendou Shi (A History of Economic Fluctuations during Taisho
and Showa Era), vol.3, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo,
pp.1315-1316.
16 For details on the debates on the return to the gold standard,
see Bank of Japan [1983],
Nippon Ginko Hyakunen-Shi (Bank
of Japan: The First Hundred Years), vol.3, Tokyo, pp.136-168;
and Patrick [1971].
17 The amount at the end of 1914 was 341 million yen, or 7.2
percent of GNP.
18
See Bank of Japan [1983], pp.363-379; Takahashi,
Kamekichi [1954],
Taisho Showa Zaikai Hendou Shi (A
History of Economic Fluctuations during Taisho and Showa
Era), vol.1, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, pp.445-467.
19 Having served as Governor of the BOJ twice, he had close
relationships with Benjamin Strong, President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and Montagu Norman, Governor
of the Bank of England.
20 Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot in November 1930 and
replaced by Reijiro Wakatsuki in April 1931.
21 Under the gold standard, the parity of one yen was
equivalent of 49.845 U.S. cents and 2.0291 shillings. In
Bank of Japan May 2009
10
November 1932, the yen hit 20 cents and 1.14 shillings.
22 Itoh, Masanao [2003], ��Showa Shonen no Kin��yu Kiki:
Sono Kozo to Taio,�� (Financial Crises at the Dawn of the
Showa Era: Structure and Policy Responses), Abe, Etsuo ed.,
Kin��yu Kisei wa Naze Hajimatta ka (Why Financial
Regulations Began?), Nihon Keizai Hyoron Sha, Tokyo,
pp.155-193. Even though Japan introduced the Law
Concerning the Prevention of Expatriation of Capital in July
1932 and the Law Concerning Foreign Exchange Control in
May 1933, Japan��s exchange controls during the Takahashi
term were mild. Meanwhile, some European countries, such as
Germany and Austria, imposed strict exchange controls.
Importers and exporters in Japan were able to buy and sell
foreign exchange freely via private banks until the end of 1937.
Similarly, investors were free to buy and sell foreign securities,
provided that they declared that the transactions were ��not
speculative.��
23 Osaka Nichinichi Shinbun, 9 and 10 March 1932. Also, on
April 18, 1932, BOJ Governor Hisaakira Hijikata stated that the
government intended to have the BOJ underwrite government
bonds. BOJ Archives, 3943, ��Documents from Meetings of
Directors and Branch Managers, Spring-Autumn 1932.��
24 Kindleberger, Charles p. [1973],
The World in Depression,
1929-1939, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, p.166.
25 See Shizume, Masato [2007b], ��A Reassessment of Japan��s
Monetary Policy during the Great depression: The Constraints
and Remedies,��
RIEB Discussion paper 208, Kobe University.
The categorization is based on Eichengreen, Barry [1992],
Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression,
1919-1939, Oxford University Press, New York, p.293 (Table
10.1).
26 Nanto, Dick K., and Shinji Takagi [1985], ��Korekiyo
Takahashi and Japan��s Recovery from the Great Depression,��
American Economic Review 75-3, pp.369-74.
27 Okura, Masanori and Juro Teranishi [1994], ��Exchange Rate
and Economic Recovery of Japan in the 1930s,��
Hitotsubashi
Journal of Economics, 35, pp.1-22.
28 Umeda, Masanobu [2006], ��1930 Nendai Zenhan ni Okeru
Nihon no Defure Dakkyaku no Haikei: Kawase Reto Seisaku,
Zaisei Seisaku, Kin��yu Seisaku�� (On the Japanese Experience
of Escaping from Deflation during the Early 1930s: Exchange
Rate Policy, Monetary Policy, and Fiscal Policy),
Kin��yu
Kenkyu (Monetary Studies) 25-1, pp.145-181.
29 Cha, Myung Soo [2003], ��Did Korekiyo Takahashi Rescue
Japan from the Great Depression?��
Journal of Economic
History 63-1, pp.127-44.
30 See Iida, Yasuyuki, and Yasushi Okada [2004], ��Showa
Kyoko to Yoso Infure Ritsu no Suikei,�� (The Showa
Depression and estimation of Inflation Expectation), Iwata,
Kikuo ed.,
Showa Kyoko no Kenkyu (A Thesis on the Showa
Depression), Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo. Iida and Okada
[2004] argue that these two events shifted expectations in
advance, as market participants anticipated them.
31 See Shizume, Masato [2008], ��Ryo-Taisen-Kan-Ki Nihon ni
okeru Bukka Hendo Yoso no Keisei: Shohin Sakimono Kakaku
Deta o Mochiita Bunseki (On Inflation Expectation during the
Inter-War Period in Japan: An Analysis Using Price Data of
Commodity Futures),
RIEB Discussion Paper J97, Kobe
University. Shizume [2008] argues that the departure from the
gold standard had significant effects on expectations, while the
BOJ underwriting of government bonds had no such effect. He
draws his conclusions from a quantitative analysis based on
commodity futures prices, and a narrative analysis based on
comments of contemporary market participants. The markets,
he reports, anticipated the Japanese departure from the gold
standard, as well as the resulting inflation and currency
depreciation in the face of Britain��s departure from the standard.
He also finds that markets did not anticipate inflation when the
debt-financed public spending and BOJ underwriting of the
national debt were announced.
32 Shizume [2007b] argues that the long-term interest rate in
Japan moved along with the British rate.
33 See Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan M. Taylor [2004],
Global
Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge and New York. Obstfeld and
Taylor [2004] apply the concept of the macroeconomic policy
trilemma in their historical studies on the relationship between
the currency systems and monetary policies of a number of
countries. They argue that the gold standard system is a typical
policy regime designed to maintain free capital movements and
a fixed exchange rate, while sacrificing independent monetary
policy.
34 Itoh [2003], p.156.
35 Eichengreen [1992], pp.298-309.
36 For details on this argument, see, for example, Ministry of
Finance [1965],
Showa Zaisei Shi (A Financial History of
Showa Era), vol.1, Tokyo, pp.134-140; and Shima, Kinzo
[1983], ��Iwayuru Takahashi Zaisei ni Tsuite�� (On the So-called
Takahashi Economic Policy),
Kin��yu Ken��kyu (Monetary
Studies), 2-2. Along this line, the underwriting of government
bonds by the central bank was prohibited in Japan under Article
5 of the Finance Law of 1947.
37 Bordo, Michael D., and Hugh Rockoff [1996], ��The Gold
Standard as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval,��
Journal
of Economic History 56-2, pp.389-428.
38 Shizume, Masato [2007a], ��Sustainability of Public Debt:
Evidence from Pre-World War II Japan,��
RIEB Discussion
paper 201, Kobe University.
39 Though Takahashi advocated the use of fiscal policy during
a recession, he recognized the importance of fiscal discipline in
the long-run. See Smethurst, Richard J. [2007],
From Foot
Soldier to Finance Minister: Takahashi Korekiyo, Japan��s
Keynes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts)
and London.
Bank of Japan Review is published by the Bank of Japan
to explain recent economic and financial topics for a wide
range of readers. This report, 2009-E-2, is a translation
of the original Japanese issue, 2009-J-1, published in
April 2009. The views expressed in the Review are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those
of the Bank of Japan. If you have comments or
questions, please contact Masato Shizume, Director and
Senior Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic
Studies (E-mail: masato.shizume@boj.or.jp).
Bank of
Japan Review and
Bank of Japan Working Paper can be
obtained through the Bank of Japan��s website
(http://www.boj.or.jp/en).
