NOTES ON HUME��S ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Notes on Hume��s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

PHIL 202: Modern Philosophy / Tim Black / Fall 2008

California State University, Northridge 

Section 1  

      1. Man is an active being; the ��easy and obvious manner�� of doing philosophy

appeals to this aspect of humankind.  Man is also a reasonable being; the ��accurate and abstruse�� style of philosophy appeals to this aspect of humankind. 

      2. Hume recommends a mixed kind of life.

      3. Hume here suggests that the truth of a philosophical claim involves its being

      useful and its being acceptable by society. 


Section 2 


      1. Ideas and Impressions

      A. Impressions: ��[A]ll our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or

            feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.��

      B. Ideas: ��[T]he less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when

            we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above-mentioned.��

      2. The Copy Principle: ��[A]ll our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our

      impressions or more lively ones.��

      3. Hume��s Method: When we think that �� a philosophical term is employed

without any meaning or idea,�� we should try to trace that term (idea) back to an impression, to determine whether it is a copy of an impression.  If we cannot do this, then we can be sure that the term is employed without a meaning. 


Section 3 


      1. Principles of Connection Among Ideas

      A. Resemblance

      B. Contiguity in time or place

      C. Cause and Effect 


Section 4 


      1. Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact

      A. Relations of Ideas are ��discoverable by the mere operation of thought��

      and are ��either demonstratively or intuitively certain.��

      B. Matters of Fact are not discoverable by the mere operation of thought,

            and are neither demonstratively nor intuitively certain.

            i. ��All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on

                  the relation of Cause and Effect.��

      ii. ��What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?��

      a. Demonstrative Reasoning (i.e., ��that concerning

relations of ideas��) is not the foundation of our conclusions from experience.

   1. The negation of a conclusion from experience—e.g.,

that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects—implies no contradictions.

   2. Demonstrative reasoning gives us conclusions

   whose negations imply contradictions.

   3. Thus, demonstrative reasoning is not the

   foundation of conclusions from experience.

      b. Moral Reasoning (i.e., ��that concerning matter of fact

and existence��) is not the foundation of our conclusions from experience.

   1. If every instance I of a type of argument T is

founded on the supposition that P is true, then no argument of type T can prove that P is true.

   2. Every instance of moral reasoning is founded on

the supposition that the future will resemble the past or that causes that appear similar will cause similar effects.

   3. Thus, no instance of moral reasoning can prove

that the future will resemble the past or that causes that appear similar will cause similar effects. 


Section 5 


      1. So what is the foundation of our conclusions from experience?  Hume says that

            the ��principle is custom or habit.��

      2. Hume says that ��belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady

            conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.��

  3. Cause and Effect is the only relation that can generate beliefs.  Resemblance and

            contiguity enliven ideas only when belief is already present. 


Section 6 


      1. Probability: When we notice that B follows A more often than C does, we are

      moved by custom to believe that B will follow A (whenever we see A). 


Section 7 


      1. Where do we get our idea of Necessary Connection?

      A. In answering this question, Hume applies his method: ��To be fully

acquainted �� with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its impression.��

      B. According to Hume, we cannot find an impression of necessary

            connection itself when ��we look about us towards external objects.��

      C. According to Hume, we cannot find an impression of necessary

            connection itself when we look inward.

      D. We get our idea of necessary connection from a connection that we feel in

the mind: Hume says that ��after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist.  This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.�� 


            E. Two Definitions of Cause

      i. A cause is ��an object, followed by another, and where all the objects,

similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.  Or in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.��

      ii. A cause is ��an object followed by another, and whose appearance always

            conveys the thought to that other.�� 


Section 8 


    1.  We seem to believe that all events, including human actions, are bound by

certain causal laws.  Call this necessity.  We also seem to believe that human beings have free will, that we can either act in certain ways or not.  Call this liberty.  Liberty and necessity seem incompatible: How is it that we can either act in certain ways or not if we are bound by certain causal laws?

    2.  The Solutions

      A. Compatibilism: Free will is compatible with determinism; both free will

      and determinism are true.

      B. Determinism: Free will and determinism are incompatible; free will is

            false while determinism is true.

      C. Libertarianism: Free will and determinism are incompatible;

            determinism is false while free will is true.

      3.  Hume��s Compatibilism

      A. For Hume, Necessity takes the form of ��the constant conjunction of

            similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other.��

      B. For Hume, Liberty means ��a power of acting or not acting, according to

the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.��

      4. According to one of Hume��s arguments for compatibilism, both liberty and

            necessity are required for morality.

      A. Necessity is required for morality

      (1) Either it is an accident that I act as I do, or it isn��t.

(2) If it is an accident, then it is irrational for me to hold people morally responsible for their actions.

(3) If it is not an accident, then determinism is true (since there will be some causal explanation of my actions).

(4) Therefore, either people are not morally responsible for their actions, or determinism is true.

            B. Liberty is required for morality

      (1) Either I chose to act as I did, or I didn��t.

(2) If I did not choose to act as I did, then it is irrational for anyone to hold me morally responsible for my actions.

(3) If I did choose to act as I did, then liberty is true.

(4) Therefore, either I am not morally responsible for my actions, or liberty is true.

      5. How is it that liberty and necessity are compatible?

      A. Liberty involves a lack of constraint, while necessity involves causality.

Since liberty and necessity are concerned with different things, there is no reason why it can��t be true both that I am free to act as I do (that is, not constrained) and that I am determined to act as I do (that is, that my actions are causally determined by factors such as my beliefs and desires). 


Section 10 


      1. Hume��s argument against the adequacy of testimonial evidence for miracles

      A. Uniform experiences are those that completely favor one belief over its

contraries.  Uniform experiences provide Proof that one event (e.g. heat) will follow another event (e.g. flame).

            B. Non-uniform experiences are those that provide evidence both in favor of

and against a certain belief. Non-uniform experiences support the Probability (to a certain degree) that one event will follow another.

C. Testimonial evidence does not give us a proof of the claim that miracles have occurred.

i. Suppose that we have a proof, in the form of testimonial evidence, that a miracle occurred.

                  ii. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.

            iii. We have a uniform experience of the world acting in accordance

      with the laws of nature.  That is, we have a proof of those laws.

iv. Thus, we have a proof both that a miracle occurred and that no miracle has occurred.

                  v. We therefore should not believe, on the basis of testimony, that a

miracle has occurred.  Rather, we should withhold belief as to whether a miracle has occurred.

      d. Testimonial evidence does not support the probability of the claim that

            miracles have occurred.

      i. No miracle has been ��attested by a sufficient number of men, of

such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves.��

                  ii. Those who hear of and report miracles are quite credulous.

                  iii. Miracles, and reports thereof, mainly ��abound among ignorant

      and barbarous nations.��

                  iv. Testimony in favor of miracles is ��opposed by an infinite number

      of witnesses.�� 


Section 12 


      Skepticism 


1. Hume suggests that we should adopt a Mitigated Skepticism.  This sort of

      skeptical attitude includes

      A. a healthy skeptical attitude, or an open-mindedness, at the beginning of

      inquiries, and

      B. limiting our inquiries ��to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow

      capacity of human understanding.��